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I. Introduction 
In recent years, the pharmaceutical industry has undergone intense 
criticism from a myriad of opponents from President Clinton to the 
common citizen. In fact, Bill Clinton included comprehensive health care 
reform in his election platform, and the pharmaceutical industry with its 
high profits has emerged as a scape goat in this debate. Recent 
developments, including Congress' delay of any legislative health care 
reform and the election of a Republican majority in both houses of 
Congress, have decreased the short run potential of any comprehensive 
health care reform. However, because of the rising costs associated with 
health care, some sort of comprehensive legislation is likely to occur within 
the next decade. 
The effects that such legislation would have on the pharmaceutical 
industry are not certain, but such legislation could ultimately hurt 
economic growth in the industry. The industry has faced opposition from 
the government before. Between 1959 and 1961, Senator Estes Kefauver 
chaired hearings on the industry's pricing policies (Scherer 97). Since that 
time, the pharmaceutical industry has faced few problems, but, by 1992, 
overall health care costs had risen to 14% of GNP, the highest of any 
industrialized nation. Due to the maturing baby boom generation, these 
costs will continue to rise in the coming years. As a result, the health care 
industry, and especially the pharmaceutical manufacturers, have again 
attracted the attention and contempt of the U.S. government as it looks for 
ways to curb these rising costs. 
The criticism of the pharmaceutical industry results primarily from 
the high prices of some brand name prescription drugs and the 
consistently high profits that these pharmaceutical companies have 
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experienced. Indeed, much of the proposed legislation stresses the use of 
generics over name brand drugs. This preference would not only hurt the 
economic growth and potential profits of the industry, especially those 
companies that produce brand name drugs, but it would also slow the 
technological progress made by these pioneering firms. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, research and development (hereafter referred to 
as R&D) costs, those costs associated with the development of new 
medicines, have been significantly higher than the R&D costs in other 
industries. A danger of comprehensive health care legislation is that it 
would discourage the development of new drugs. 
It can be argued that because of the nature of the industry these 
abnormal returns (those returns which vary from the market return) that 
the pioneering pharmaceutical firms experience are justified. Indeed, the 
risk involved in the pharmaceutical industry is higher than most 
industries. A firm could spend billions of dollars developing a new drug 
only to fail to gain approval from the FDA. This represents a substantial 
risk to capital, and utility theory states that for increased risk, an investor 
(in this case the pharmaceutical firms) requires a higher rate of return as 
compensation for the increased risk. This factor in addition to some other 
historical differences of the pharmaceutical industry from other industries 
might explain the unusually high profits. 
Because of the issues of high prices and abnormal returns, the 
pharmaceutical industry has generated enough attention to warrant 
further study. This paper will focus primarily on the factors that 
contribute to the abnormal returns that firms in the industry experience. 
•
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II. Literature Review 
Historical Differences 
Two studies serve as the primary references for my work. The first 
was a study by F.M. Scherer (1993) which served primarily as a source of 
background and historical data, and the second was a study by Henry 
Grabowski and John Vernon (1987). In the 1993 study, Scherer noted 
that the pharmaceutical industry has differed from other industries for 
three reasons. Each of these factors lend explanation to why the 
pharmaceutical industry has experienced such high growth and 
profitability. 
1.) Physician Decision-Making: In most cases of consumption, the 
consumer and the decision-maker are the same person, but this does not 
occur in the pharmaceutical industry. "Since the 1930' s most high potency 
drugs have been available in the United States only by prescription. Thus, 
the consumer and the consumption decision maker (the prescribing 
physician) are not the same" (Scherer 98). If a consumer purchases an· 
automobile, said person would decide what car to buy, and only two 
parties exist in the decision-making: the consumer and the producer. With 
pharmaceuticals, an intermediary, the prescribing physician, exists 
between the producer and the consumer. 
The distinction of physician decision-making has certain implications 
for the pharmaceutical industry. First of all, as mentioned above, it does 
eliminate the consumer from the consumption decision. In addi tion, in a 
1991 study by Richard Caves, the author addressed the issue of price 
sensitivity. "When the choice lies between a branded pioneer drug and its 
generic competitors, the physician may not be sensitive to price 
differences" (Caves 5). When it comes to prescribing drugs, the physician 
-
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does not generally decide on a drug because of price but rather because of 
its treatment capacity and brand loyalty. As a result, physician decision-
making can have a major effect on the consumption process. 
2.) Imperfect Information: Since the 1940's, more than 1200 new drugs 
have been introduced into the United States (Scherer 98). In the 1991 
study by Caves, Whinston, and Hurwitz, the authors noted that physicians 
lack "ready and well-organized" information on the "effectiveness and 
riskiness" of substitutes, generic drugs (Caves 5). The authors further 
stated that physicians rely upon customary behavior and habit when 
prescribing drugs (Caves 5). These two factors result in imperfect 
information in the pharmaceutical industry. Because of the wide range of 
choices, physicians cannot possibly have complete knowledge of all the 
alternatives, and as a result, they cannot accurately inform patients about 
the alternatives available. Instead they rely on habit and custom. 
Information failures result. 
Imperfect information affects profitability as well. Pharmaceutical 
firms use this industry characteristic to their advantage. Pharmaceutical 
firms rely heavily on cultivating and maintaining good relationships with 
doctors through free samples and merchandise. These relationships 
develop into firm loyalty by doctors. The doctors become an agent, in a 
sense, of the pharmaceutical firm. They rely on certain firms for certain 
drugs, and as a result, they market these drugs to the consumer. The 
brand loyalty that develops offsets the cheaper price of generics and 
enables these pioneering firms to enjoy steady growth and profits. 
3.) Third-Party Reimbursements: "Third party reimbursement plans 
operated by the government and private insurers have expanded to cover 
an estimated 44% of prescription drug outlays in 1987 up from 28% in 
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1977 (Scherer 99). With these third-party reimbursements, the consumer 
often does not pay the full costs of the prescription drugs. Third-party 
reimbursements from insurance companies and the government along with 
physician decision-making eliminate the consumer from much of the 
consumption process. It also lowers the price actually paid by the 
consumer for the drugs which would lead to increased demand for the 
product. 
These three differences distinguish the pharmaceutical industry and 
make it unique from other industries. Scherer noted that the combination 
of these three major differences results in stronger drug demand and less 
price elasticity of demand. With this in mind, he noted that this can result 
in considerable monopoly power for certain companies which have well­
accepted drugs. 
R&D Expenditures 
A further difference between pharmaceuticals and other industries 
can be associated with its high R&D expenditures relative to other 
industries. Before the 1962 passage of the Kefauver-Harris Act, the costs 
associated with developing a new drug were on average around $6 million 
after conversion to 1990 price levels (Scherer 99). At present, the average 
costs associated with the development of a new drug exceed $50 million 
(Scherer 99). These costs are relatively higher than those in other 
industries. Indeed, these figures support the fact that R&D is an essential 
part of the industry, and in fact, these expenditures are probably 
necessary to remain competitive in the industry. When used effectively, 
R&D increases the demand for drugs because it increases the quality of the 
drugs produced. If legislation switched focus from brand names to 
generics, it could ultimately discourage R&D and the development of new 
-
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and improved drugs. The high costs associated with developing new and 
improved drugs would no longer be worth the risk that it might not 
become FDA approved. In the long run, this would hurt profits and 
discourage research into better drugs. As a result, the quality of drugs 
would decline, and this would affect both the consumer because of the 
decreased quality and the pharmaceutical firms because it would lower 
profi ts. 
Relevant Legislation 
Since the 1960's, Congress has passed certain significant pieces of 
legislation which have affected the pharmaceutical industry. With each 
piece of legislation, Congress has attempted to balance concerns over 
prescription drug price levels while still encouraging innovation (Frank 
165). 
1.) The Kefauver-Harris Act: Because of the information failures that 
result because of the large number of prescription drugs, Congress passed 
this Act in 1962. The Act granted the Food and Drug Administration more 
regulatory power. As a result, the FDA increased the stringency associated 
with the approval of a new drug. This Act with its increased regulation 
and testing time of new drugs led to some of the increases in R&D 
expenditures that occurred after its passage. Since the passage of the 
Kefauver-Harris Act, it now takes an average of eight years for a new drug 
to go from the start of clinical trials to FDA approval, and the more 
stringent regulation imposed on the industry has resulted in only 23% of 
developed drugs receiving FDA approval. 
In effect, this Act has turned the development of new drugs into a 
high return yet high risk game. This Act can account for increased R&D 
and an increased chance that new drugs will not receive FDA approval. 
-
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This has added risk to the industry, and the only way to encourage 
investment in an industry with increased risk is to offer the possibility for 
increased returns. The Kefauver-Harris Act had a significant impact on the 
returns of the pharmaceutical industry. 
2.) The Waxman-Hatch Act: Many lobbyist for the pharmaceutical 
industry, noted that the lengthy approval procedures in essence limited 
the benefits of patent protection. "The 1984 Act increased returns to 
innovation by extending the period of patent protection to take into 
account the time between receipt of a patent and FDA approval of a drug 
for sale in the market" (Frank 165). Patent life lasted 17 years, but when 
calculating in an average of 8 years for approval, the firm that develops 
the new drug would actually have only 9 years of exclusive rights to the 
drug. As costs of R&D continued to rise and patent protection stayed the 
same, the firms found it difficult to recoup these costs. In response, 
Congress passed the Waxman-Hatch Act in 1984. This Act provided for an 
extension of the drug patents by up to five years to compensate for the' 
potential revenue lost by the lengthy approval process. 
This increase in patent protection was important to the industry as it 
encouraged the continuing development of new drugs. By extending 
patent protection, Congress encouraged both innovation and extended 
monopoly power for those firms which produce these drugs. This, in 
essence, increases the potential to earn abnormally high returns over a 
longer time period, and this would increase profitability for the firms. 
Increasing Generic Competition 
The Waxman-Hatch Act also included a section concerning the 
production of generic drugs. "A 1983 U.S. Supreme Court decision held 
that even when patent protection ended, most generic imitations had to 
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undergo clinical trials nearly as rigorous and costly as the originally 
approved molecule" (Scherer 100). This kind of regulation discouraged the 
growth of generics. The Waxman-Hatch Act changed that. "The Act allows 
a generic entrant to submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 
that demonstrates only the bioequivalence of its drug to the original" 
(Caves 10). This significantly reduced the barriers to entry for the generic 
drugs. 
This loosening of restrictions encouraged growth of the generic 
market. As a result, generics gained an increasing market share, thus 
reducing the demand for brand-name drugs. This decrease in demand 
would affect the profitability of the pioneering firms. As generic 
competition increases, their monopolistic power over that drug would 
decrease, and their profits would probably return to more normal levels. 
III. Theoretical Framework 
The nature of my study requires a two part theoretical framework: 
an explanation of the microeconomic model the industry most closely 
resembles and a valuation model. The pharmaceutical industry is an 
interesting and complex industry. The firms in the industry do not 
compete in perfect competition, but unlike the automobile industry, they 
do not exist as an oligopoly. The firms in the pharmaceutical industry 
compete in a monopolistic competition type of atmosphere. 
Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
The theory of monopolistic competition is based on three 
assumptions: 
1.) Differentiated but highly substitutable products 
2.) Free Entry 
3.) Free Exit 
• 
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The shaded area under the demand curve represents the profits that the 
firm receives. In a monopolistically competitive industry, pro d u c t 
differentiation is a dominant feature of the market just as in 
o Ii gop 0 I y. However, in an oligopoly, free entry does not exist as it does in 
monopolistic competition. It is the assumption of free entry which 
distinguishes monopolistic competition from other industries. When a firm 
in the industry develops a monopoly over a certain product, free entry 
allows other firms to enter the industry, thus eliminating the profits. 
When it no longer becomes profitable to produce this product, firms would 
leave the industry. Increases in demand would generally cause an 
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increase in profits as it shifts the demand curve upward. In 
addition, increases in marginal costs, perhaps from increased 
R&D expenditures, would cause a decrease in profits because an 
upward shift in the marginal cost curve would decrease the 
shaded area under the demand curve. 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Monopolistic Competition 
The pharmaceutical industry does not perfectly display the 
characteristics of monopolistic competition, but its workings most closely 
resemble this theoretical framework. 
Differentiated Products 
This is a definite characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Pharmaceutical firms produce drugs that may be effective treatment 
against the same disease. These drugs may be similar, but they most 
likely produce different results when combating the virus or disease and 
probably have different side effects. For example, currently, a number of 
firms produce drugs that treat heart attack patients in order to prevent 
future heart attacks. Each drug has different characteristics such as basic 
chemical components, but each is similar enough, that they can be 
substituted for each other. The same is true for many of the drugs 
produced by pharmaceutical firms: they are differentiated but highly 
substitutable. 
Free Entry 
Free entry is not clearly a characteristic of the pharmaceutical 
industry. Is entry really free? High costs of R&D and recruitment of 
qualified personnel would seemingly create a barrier to entry. New firms 
cannot freely enter the pharmaceutical industry due to these high costs, 
and therefore, new firms would not enter the industry to drive profits 
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down. This barrier would contradict the theory of monopolistic 
competition. However, the theory does not define "new" firms. After the 
patent expires on a particular drug, existing firms (acting as new firms) 
would enter into that drug producing firm's market (the industry) and 
eliminate that firm's monopoly profits. 
Essentially, each of the pioneering firms, those that spend money on 
R&D to discover and patent new drugs, would have a monopoly until 
patent protection expires. During the patent life of a drug, the firm that 
produces that patent protected drug would have a monopoly over the 
market for that particular drug. They can charge whatever price they 
choose and earn monopolistic profits. Once the patent expires, existing 
firms in the industry can now produce either brand name or generic copies 
of that drug. These products (drugs in this case) produced by existing 
firms as opposed to "new" ones would be differentiated but highly 
substitutable, a characteristic of monopolistic competition. How much 
market share for that particular drug that the original patent holder 
maintains depends on brand loyalty and , with the advent of new entrants, 
competitive pncmg. The entrance of "new" firms into the market created a 
competitive atmosphere that reduces the profits of the original patent 
holder (the monopoly). 
During the patent life of a drug, "the original patent holder typically 
acquires brand loyalty after making the product exclusively during the 
patent life" (Kurdas 113). This is the result of extensive marketing and 
education efforts made by the manufacturer's representatives. Because of 
these efforts, market share of the name brand product does not erode as 
much as would be the case in other industries (Kurdas 113). Therefore, 
free entry into the pharmaceutical industry is slightly different from a 
• 
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typical monopolistically competitive industry. Although any firm can 
produce copies of the original drug after patent protection expires, will the 
profits of the original firm actually go to zero in the long run? This may 
occur with some drugs, but certain firms specialize in a certain class of 
drugs (i.e. cardiovascular drugs) and as a result may produce a better 
known or higher quality of that drug than its competitors. Because of this 
better quality, each firm's relationship with doctors, and inelasticity of 
demand, profits may not fall to zero. Thus, this allows individual firms to 
earn above market profits. 
Free Exit 
Free exit is somewhat of an illusion in this industry as well. Firms do 
not leave the industry necessarily, just as new firms do not enter the 
industry. Firms would most likely do one of two things if profits fell: 
either leave the market for that particular drug or merge with another 
firm. Sometimes, for reasons such as technological disadvantage or 
shortages of capital, the market for a particular drug may become 
unprofitable for a particular firm. The firm would not leave the entire 
pharmaceutical industry, but rather, it would leave the market for that 
particular drug. If on the other hand, if a particular firm found the 
industry unprofitable due to high costs, the firm would probably not leave 
the industry but would merge with another company. This would in a 
sense be "leaving" the industry. Mergers appear to be more prevalent 10 
the pharmaceutical industry as opposed to firms leaving the industry 
completely (i.e. free exit). Mergers are probably more popular because 
leaving the industry would result in a significant and costly loss of both 
technology and capital. The assumption of free exit is more likely in the 
•
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industry than is the assumption of free entry. Exit, though possible, is 
costly. 
Theory of Stock Valuation 
Stock prices are traditionally thought to lead economic activity. The 
rationale IS that stock prices reflect future profitability of corporations. If 
a stock's price is high now or rising steadily, then it is considered that 
company's future profitability is expected to be high. 
The Model of Stock Price Valuation shows how current stock prices can 
show future profitability. Stock prices equal the present value of a firm's 
expected profi tabili ty. 
Expected Profits 
Stock Price = L 
t (1 + k)t 
In traditional stock valuation models, the value of a company's stock 
should equal the present value of the firm's future profits. In the case of 
the pharmaceutical industry, profits can vary widely from year to year 
depending on external factors such as the economy as a whole and on 
internal factors such as the success of drug development projects. Over the 
time period, the pharmaceutical industry has generated higher returns 
than the market. In order for the stock price to outperform the market, 
investors must expect higher profits which would result in increases in the 
stock price. 
IV. Empirical Model 
•
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The preceding theoretical framework directly leads to the 
development of my hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Abnormal returns generated by the pharmaceutical 
industry are the result of certain variables: R&D expenditures, the aging 
population, and earnings per share growth. 
Hypothesis 2: Of these significant factors, R&D expenditures when 
adjusted for inflation, will have a significant effect on abnormal returns, 
and when it is lagged , it should have a positive effect. However, when a 
firm initially incurs R&D expenditures, the effect could either be positive 
or negative because R&D expenditures can shift both a supply and demand 
for the product. 
Regression Model 
My regression model was loosely based on the model developed by 
Grabowski and Vernon in a 1987 study. They developed a Schumpeterian 
competition model based on 1970's data from the pharmaceutical industry. 
Their model attempts to predict future growth in a hypothetical industry 
based on real historical data (Grabowski 491). My model used historical 
data from the pharmaceutical industry and attempted to predict what 
factors have led to the abnormal returns that the pharmaceutical industry 
has generated. 
To test my hypotheses, I used a simple OLS regression model 
utilizing data from the pharmaceutical industry from 1979 to 1990. The 
regression equation is as follows: 
Abnormal = a1 + a2%R&D + a3%R&DLag2 + a4AgingPop + a5EPSG 
Return s 
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My variables, their expected signs, and the data source are listed in Table 
1 followed by a more detailed explanation. 
Table 1 - Model Variables 
==========~==========================~=========~================== 
Variable	 Definition and Data Source 
====~============================================================= 
Abnormal Returns The difference between the percentage 
gain or loss by each firm and the 
percentage gain or loss by the market, 
the S&P 500. (Source: Wall Street 
Journal; various issues) 
% R&D (.?) The % of sales that R&D 
expenditures account for each 
firm (Source: Standard & Poors 
Industry Survey; various issues) 
% R&DLag 2 (+)	 The same as % R&D except this 
variable is lagged two years. 
(Source: S&P's Industry Survey; 
various issues) 
Aging Population (+)	 The percentage of U.S. citizens over a'ge 
45. (Source: U.S. Census) 
Earnings Per Share Growth (+)	 The percentage growth in earnings per 
share for each of the firms studied. 
(Source: S&P's Stock Reports) 
================================================================== 
Variables 
1.) Abnormal Returns: My dependent variable measures the difference 
between the percentage return on the stock of each firm and the 
percentage return on the market. Recent criticism of overpricing by the 
pharmaceutical industry has cited these high, positive abnormal returns. 
Abnormal returns were gathered from 1981 to 1990 for nine 
pharmaceutical firms listed in the Appendix. These firms were chosen on 
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the basis of their relative position 10 the industry as leading firms in both 
sales and returns, and they were also chosen because they are primarily 
involved in the development of brand name prescription drugs. In 
addition, data was more readily available for these nine firms. For each of 
these, data was gathered on percentage return on that firm's stock and on 
the percentage return on the S&P 500 index. The percentage difference 
(either above or below the market return) represented the abnormal 
return on that stock. 
2.) R&D: R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales were gathered for 
each of the nine firms. R&D poses an interesting problem regarding how it 
will affect abnormal returns. Contemporaneously, it could prove to 
positively affect abnormal returns because it represents opportunity for 
the development of new drugs, and thus, it would increase returns. Also, 
R&D expenditures could cause increases in the marginal revenue and 
demand curves which would lead to increased abnormal profits. However, 
because it is an additional expense, it could also lead to shifts in the 
marginal and average total cost curves. Increased expenses and operating 
costs incurred because of R&D could lower current net profits. If a 
greater percentage of sales is devoted to R&D, then it could 
adversely affect a company's profits. If investors view the increase 
in current R&D expenditures as a decrease in short run profits and if they 
have short run intentions regarding their investment in a pharmaceutical 
firm, then they might sell, thus driving the price down. If an investor is 
looking at the long run, an increase in the percentage of sales devoted 
t 0 R&D expenditures could ultimately mean an increase in future 
profitability. The long run investor would probably ant i c i pat e increased 
demand for drugs produced b y the pharmaceutical firm, and the price of 
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the stock would Increase to reflect increased expected future 
pro fi tab iii t y. Because of this conflict, the effect of current R&D 
expenditures could either have a positive or negative effect on abnormal 
returns. 
3.) R&D Lagged: Because of the conflict in theory, an additional R&D 
variable that is lagged was used to possibly resolve this potential conflict. 
Data restrictions and degrees of freedom problems limited the lag to only 
two years. However, this should be sufficient to determine whether 
previous R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales significantly affect 
abnormal returns. Lagged R&D expenditures should have a positive affect 
on abnormal returns, because as various projects mature, investors are 
better able to predict the profitability of certain drug development efforts. 
4.) Demographics: As the baby boomer generation ages, the population of 
the U.S. becomes increasingly older. The median age continues to rise, and 
this will definitely affect economic growth. Data on the aging population 
was gathered as the percentage of people over the age of 45. By their ' 
mid-forties, the use of pharmaceuticals tends to increase as the demand 
increases for such common problems as diabetes and high blood pressure. 
Data was found in two Census studies: State Population Estimates by Age 
and Sex: 1980-1992 and Summary Population and Housing Characteristics-
U.S. Because an aging population should increase demand for 
pharmaceuticals, the profits generated by these companies should increase. 
Increases in profits would lead to abnormal returns, and therefore, its 
expected effect on abnormal returns is negative. 
5.) Earnings Per Share Growth: Earnings per share growth was measured 
as the percentage change from year to year on individual firm's earnings 
per share. This variable was gathered from Standard & Poors Stock 
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Reports. This variable is important because it shows certain characteristics 
about individual firms and how they distribute their earnings. Positive 
earnings per share growth would mean increased profits, and therefore, its 
effect on abnormal returns should be positive. 
v. Results 
After the tests of my empirical model were run, the results 
were the opposite of what was expected. 
Table 2 - Results 
============================~===================================== 
Variable Expected Sign Actual Sign Coefficient T-Statistic 
================================================================== 
%R&D ? + .9804 .7048 
Demographics + -.0660 .3683 
EPS Growth + + .0090 .7149 
% R&D Lagged2 + .3953 .2730 
R-squared: .041748 
Durbin-Watson: 1.471448 
Degrees of Freedom: 8 5 
================================================================== 
The results were below expectations. The signs of all but 
one of the variables were opposite of expected. None of the 
varaiables proved significant, and to say the least, these results 
were disappointing. 
1.) Percentage R&D: Although I was unsure of which sign this 
variable would have, I hypothesized that it would have a 
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negative effect on the profitability of a pharmaceutical firm 
because it would be an additional expenditure. Theorizing that 
investors are generally short term minded, it would create a 
negative effect on the profitability of a company because it 
would be viewed as an additional expense. The results are 
insignificant and, therefore, cannot definitively make a case for 
whether an investor has long-run or short-run interests when 
investing in the stock of a pharmaceutical company. 
Additionally, the insignificance of this variable suggests that no 
relationship exists between R&D expenditures as a percentage of 
sales and the profitability of a pharmaceutical firm. 
2.) Percentage R&D Lagged 2 Years: This variable the expected 
sign. I hypothesized that lagged R&D would positively affect the 
profitability of a company. However, the fact that this variable 
is insignificant indicates that R&D lagged for two years does not 
significantly effect on the profitability of a pharmaceutical firm. 
3.) Demographics: Again, this variable had a sign opposite of 
the expected, and it, too, was insignificant. This would suggest 
that as the population becomes increasingly older 
pharmaceutical firms do not benefit as a result. Intuitively, this 
would not make sense because as the population ages it would 
seem logical that the need for pharmaceuticals would increase to 
help combat high-blood pressure and diabetes. However, 
because of the low r-squared and the insignificance of this 
variable, no definitive conclusions can be made regarding the 
effect that the aging population would have on the profitability 
of a pharmaceutical firm. 
•
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4.) Earnings Per Share Growth: Of the variables, this was the 
only one that the actual sign was the same as the expected sign. 
However, this variable, too, proved insignificant. Perhaps a 
relationship does exist between the profitability of a 
pharmaceutical firm and its earnings per share growth, but this 
project was unable to establish such a relationship. 
1.) Hypothesis 1: The results from my regression would 
strongly suggest that none of these variables (R&D, R&D lagged, 
aging population, and earnings per share growth) affect the 
profitabiliy of a pharmaceutical firm. Perhaps some of these 
variables would significantly affect profitability if not for the 
incompleteness of the model (which the low r-squared suggests). 
2.) Hypothesis 2.: The results from my model would reject this 
hypothesis. Current R&D expenditures do not significantly 
affecct the returns generated by the pharmaceutical industry. 
Further, R&D lagged two years does not significantly affect these 
returns, either. The opposite signs generated by these two 
variables also contradict the hypothesis' assumption of the long 
or short-run intentions of investors. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In conclusion, these tests do not show significant support 
for my hypotheses. The results indicate that the certain 
variables did have the expected sign, but none of the variables 
were significant. The fact that the test results had such a low r­
squared would suggest that the model is significantly 
incomplete. No definitive conclusions can be made regarding 
how these variables actually affect the profitability of a 
•
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pharmaceutical firm. These results would suggest that the 
percentage of sales devoted to R&D would present minimal risk 
to the firm, and that the amount invested in R&D would not 
affect individual investors preference for pharmaceutical stocks. 
These implications are not definitive because of the 
incompleteness of the model. 
The results of the test highly suggest that a number of 
critical and significant variables are missing from my empirical 
model. Perhaps the time period studied is too short, and future 
research into this area should expand the time period. Further, 
an additional variable which would separate a pharmaceutical 
firm's brand name drug sales from over-the-counter drug sales 
would strengthen the model. Accurate data on the generic 
market share could further enhance the model. In addition, 
perhaps I could experiment with longer lags for the R&D 
variable to see if that would improve the model. 
Althoug the results were poor, they do show that none of 
these variables by themselves significantly affect the returns 
generated by the pharmaceutical firms studied. This is a 
significant finding because it suggests that other variables need 
to be added to the model to show what variables do affect the 
returns generated in this industry. Further research which 
explores new variables and a longer time period for the study 
would significantly change this project and would most certainly 
strengthen it. 
• 
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Appendix 
Table of Pharmaceutical Firms Used in Study 
================================~=============================== 
Name of Firm 
===========================================~==================== 
1.) Bristol-Myers Squibb 
2.) Eli Lilly & Co. 
3.) Merck & Co. 
4.) Pfizer Inc. 
5.) Schering-Plough 
6.) Smithkline Beecham 
7.) Syntex Corp. 
8.) Upjohn Co. 
9.) Warner-Lambert Co. 
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